29. In some cases,  the line of mobilization of forces and the specialization of our strategy according to the circumstances prevailing in each area are conducted in a mechanistic and unelaborated manner. As a result, it is becoming difficult today to rally new, inexperienced, hesitant, or even frightened labour–popular  forces. Thus, it is getting harder to liberate them from the policy of the employers, bourgeois parties, reformism, and opportunism.

Without giving detailed guidelines and solutions for each individual case, the CC needs to educate and assist the members and cadres of the Party and KNE in contemplating each issue, acquiring criterion, becoming armed with their experience —no matter how much or little— utilizing our documents, showing a spirit of initiative, seeking to resolve problems and study the results. The CC needs to assist in a way that the members and cadres can see their mistakes and correct them.

Especially at the Congress, it is necessary to highlight not only the positive but also the negative experience gained, the tactical errors, the experience drawn from tackling problems. The insufficient, almost mechanistic specialization of the struggle and mobilization of forces is a typical situation, especially in the labour and trade union movement, and other movements as well. Our correct criticism and polemics are often generic and blanket; they are not evidential and specific. Criticizing parties by just saying that they follow a “crisis management” policy is not always understood by the workers and popular strata, nor does it prove the anti-people nature of their policy, even though we do have proof and elaborations to pursue a reasoned political criticism, to be evidential of why their policy is based on the interests of the bourgeoisie and, therefore, is against the interests of the social majority.

Very often, the CC members ourselves insufficiently guide our comrades, the Party Groups and Organs, by using slogans and copying party texts to trade union announcements, without deliberating with the members of the executive boards. The superficial verbal escalation is not an apt ideological confrontation nor does protect us from the ideological flank attack of the class opponent and all kinds of opportunists.

However, that does not mean that we consider the negative correlation of forces to be a matter of propaganda; that it is not based on the material and political operation of capitalism in Greece and internationally, under conditions of extremely high growth of labour productivity, a long-standing bourgeois parliamentary legitimacy and many more. Under these circumstances, linking the demands of struggle to socialism, the society for which we struggle, requires a good knowledge of the new issues and problems arising, a reasoned method to highlight their causes, a firm confrontation with bourgeois policy and an escalation in connecting them with the socialist prospect.

Our activity to organize the labour movement and the masses, to rally forces spearheaded by the acute problems, and our work to advance the social alliance are confronted with an objective pressure exerted by labour, popular and even petty-bourgeois forces asking for solutions here and now, small gains and even narrow sectional demands.

However, the response to this pressure cannot be found in the deeply incorrect and marginally expressed perception that the “ideological–political entrenchment”, even a temporary “sectarianism”, could protect us from the opportunist pressure of the long-standing —and not temporary, as it turns out— counter-revolutionary period. The opposite is needed: To develop the ability to wage the struggle against forces, perceptions and stances, while trying from within to organize the masses and rally forces; not outside these processes. To be able to confront the callings that ask from us to make concessions, to carefully examine the demands and their supporting political framework and not to slip into the “minimum demands” or “minimum program” rationale, not to back down from our criticism against other forces, in the name of a questionable “broad rally of forces”. Overall, not to retreat before the pressure which will be powerful.

30. A crucial issue is to specify the criteria based on which we participate in initiatives, activities and mobilizations taking place at a local level. It is essential to first assess the problem, the demand that has been formulated, and not to judge based on the ideological–political correlation of forces amongst the participants. In addition, we also need to take into account the relative range of the mobilization. Based on that, we can also overcome a hesitation shown for the party forces to actively participate in activities of organizations and movements that did not start on our own initiative. At the same time, we need to be vigilant for actions taken by opportunist forces, which, by exploiting a problem, gather their forces and seek to flank us by supposedly promoting “a grassroots unity as opposed to the sectarianism of the KKE’s leadership”. Each activity needs to be always examined collectively and our forces need to be fully prepared for an ideological confrontation as well.

The main and most important issue is to timely assess the mood regarding any sharpening problem, to take initiatives, because, wherever we leave gaps, or a faint-heartedness or lack of initiative is observed, the initiative will be expressed and steered by forces with a problematic orientation and the struggle will be tougher. The main issue is for our forces to be ideologically, politically and organizationally armoured with our positions and our general stance on opportunism so that they are not susceptible to pressure; to work in such a way within the movement so that, with their stance and the ideological–political struggle based on reasoned arguments, they can truly manage to liberate forces from the vice-like grip of opportunism and the anti-KKE obsessions fostered by various forces.

31. Taking all the above into account, we need to steel the Party and KNE, especially the members that have recently been recruited, so they can acquire strong reflexes towards opportunism and mainly overcome its insincere manoeuvres for “joint action” in the name of an “anti-memorandum”, “anti-neoliberal”, “anti-rightist”, “anti-fascist” front —no matter how it is presented each time— aiming to put across the line of a minimum reform program, a transitional government in the framework of capitalism, and to ultimately drag us into coalitions with bourgeois parties, such as SYRIZA, the negative governmental experience of which is valuable for the revolutionary forces.

What is important is not to underestimate the role of opportunism, both under conditions of capitalism and socialism, since its source is objectively inexhaustible and its counter-revolutionary role can result in undermining and defaming the movement. Certain cadres and members of opportunist organizations, with their superficial and intentional transformations, sometimes appear as advocates of the previous Party strategy, and other times, as advocates of transitional governments, transitional political goals, or even of the very negation of the Communist Party as the conscious vanguard of the country’s working class etc. The role of reformism is equally dangerous; it exerts pressure on labour–popular forces for immediate political solutions and reforms in the framework of capitalism, utilizing both overt and covert undermining of the revolutionary class struggle. That does not mean that there is no room for workers, students, scientists, and other employees, who follow or are influenced by such forces, to be liberated from their influence. The Party members need to be properly and systematically guided regarding this issue so they can voice our own criticism before broader popular forces, clarify our own “no” to their opinions and stance, their practices in the movement.

32. The full awareness of the current situation, the retreat of the labour movement and the greater difficulties in crystallizing more concrete results, requires us to struggle without any complacency to improve the condition of the subjective factor, to strengthen the Party organizations by continuously matching the guiding operation and activity in the Party —and also the guiding operation and activity of the Party in the working class— to our strategy, our Programme, the conclusions drawn from the course of the communist movement, the current demands of class struggle.

The contradictions that we are facing show that a greater effort is needed through discussions, small meetings, ideological courses, etc., so that younger ages and relatively restless minds can understand crucial issues regarding the dilemma of “capitalism versus socialism” to a greater extent. These people see the problems of capitalism but do not see socialism as the way out in the foreseeable future; they daily face the hardships of life, work, motherhood, all of which afflict the steady participation in the movement and struggles in times when there are no outbreaks. These are all problems that have more depth than what is usually perceived, and they are often related to the way the working, and in general social life, is organized. A constant struggle is required against their impact on militants and also on our ranks, which will intensify as time goes by and there are no conditions of a dynamic rise of the class struggle, a regroupment of the labour–people’s movement in our country and of the International Communist Movement.

In this stage, the awareness and estimation of the existing militant mood level should not lead to lower expectations regarding our work in every sector: the initiative-taking, the elaboration of a plan, content and forms of action, the propaganda, the goals to mobilize forces, the renewal of the party circle of influence and party forces with working men and women, militants of younger ages in growing sectors and areas of strategic importance.

The leading organs bear the responsibility for ensuring that the general activity does not cover weaknesses and problems in order for our work to meet the strengthening of the Party Organization as much as possible.

In the Party leading staff, the comrades are at the forefront; they are undertaking a political guidance responsibility and participating in the direct intervention and activity with a sense of contribution and methodically. At the same time, there is always the need to match words with deeds, for the correct findings to be followed by the corresponding effort for individual and collective improvement in the area to which each and everyone is assigned. A very good discussion is needed on how to ensure the best possible outcome, without verbiage or shifting the responsibilities. Every leading link and cadre need to bear full responsibility and thus more substantially develop a firm belief that we can resolve what is possible each time.

This matter is also reflected in the comradely and collective spirit and how this spirit is cultivated, starting from the leading organs down to the PBOs, the quality of the collective deliberation and action, the creative and collective monitoring and the possible corrective measures.

33.  Overall, through the creative and careful monitoring of the experience drawn from the struggle, the CC should have focused on specifying the relation between the Party and the labour–trade union organizations, the other organizations of the workers, the rural and urban self-employed, the youth and women’s organizations. The issue becomes even more complex under conditions of crisis and regroupment of the movement, promotion of the social alliance; under the current conditions marked by retreat, even though the labour–people’s struggle should have objectively been directed towards socialism.

Aspects that have already been elaborated in previous Congresses, and more recently in the 20^th Congress, do not seem assimilated within the Party. That is precisely because the monitoring of decisions and results after a struggle or during an initiative in progress is not conducted through the prism of our elaborations.

In addition, today, some members and cadres seem to confuse the direction to politicize the movement, thus levelling the differences between the Party and the class-oriented trade union. Some are even talking as if the PAME were the ideological–political leader of the labour movement. Unintentionally, of course, this is a way of substituting the Party and not achieving a class-oriented radicalization. Several members and cadres are levelling the natural differences existing between the trade unions, the struggle committees for a specific issue, the women’s unions, or the parents’ associations. All these are reflecting weaknesses in the political guidance work of the Party, which is sharpened downwards. Many times these views are not perceived as wrong, as something that harms and hampers our work. In the Party Organs, the PBOs, and respectively in the KNE, we need to overcome the hesitation in responding in a comradely spirit not only to views leaning towards opportunism or are influenced by it but also to views expressing ignorance and confusion.

Much experience has now been gained within the movement. For example, on the occasion of the National Bodies on the urban self-employed and the farmers, a significant experience has been processed on how we work with radical movements, how we adjust our work based on the new developments and experience gained, how we need to work with politically disoriented forces, how we handle issues when we do not have the absolute majority or when new forces start to massively participate in the struggle, under the intensification of the problems.

Although we had accurately noticed certain schematic approaches on the issue of promoting the social alliance in an anti-capitalist and anti-monopoly direction, basically the problems remain. The discussions are not meaningful when it comes to planning the joint mobilizations of PAME, the farmers’ and self-employed associations, of the MAS (Students’ Militant Front) and OGE so that the joint action can be strengthened and the struggle can bring even more results.

34. In the context of the collective operation, there is a need to ensure the time and space necessary for the cadres to comprehensively elaborate and participate in the discussions in the leading organs, the Party Groups, the PΒΟs. Only thus, can we address the weakness existing in elaborating frameworks of struggle and demands on the necessary ideological depth, in understanding the choice criteria for the demands, in working on our line of mobilization, and also on issues regarding the structure of trade unions.

In the leading organs, a number of cadres assigned to the trade union work, although actively and militantly involved, is often less prepared to contribute to the generalization of the experience drawn from the conduct and course of the class struggle. It is an issue that we need to address with practical measures and decisiveness because we are in a period of transitioning to a generation of trade union cadres, who, in order to cope under the contemporary conditions of trade union work, need to acquire and develop multifaceted characteristics by further developing the overall ability of the communists to be able to organize the masses, to be recognized as vanguards within their workplaces.

Mainly at a PBO and Sectoral Committees level in the Party and KNE, we lag behind the needs in promoting the party members to real popular leaders for every issue that the workers'–people's families face in their work or place of residence and studies. Without this factor, the ideological and political work will be fragmented and in limbo. Special attention is needed today to form cadres, members, and organs that will not just reproduce theoretical tenets without being able to practically apply them and combine them with the vanguard work in the area they act, in the mass movement, everywhere. Of course, it is not easy to overthrow this situation overnight, but at the same time, it is not a one-way street, and combined measures are needed both from the top and bottom.

Problems still remain in the formation and operation of the Party Groups, especially in the first-level trade unions, their content, in how they are trying to implement the Party resolutions regarding the communists’ responsibility for the operation and orientation of trade unions. There is still an absence of more forward-looking planning for the sector and the area of responsibility; the improvement of the organization level; the study of the opponent's intervention; the operation of the trade unions; what issues are brought to the fore; what framework we elaborate; what goals we have to expand the vanguard and the movement infrastructures; the forces’ deployment needed. Regarding the activity planning, the executive committees often overlap, the work is not shared and a campaigning form of activity is observed on the occasion of significant events and milestones. In the Party Groups of second-level unions (Federations and Labour centres), there is a very general discussion on the existing situation, based on a generic experience that is tiresome and ineffective.