17. The developments after the outbreak of the international crisis of 2008-2009 confirm that the EU, the Eurozone are not a cohesive, stable, permanent formation.

In the years that followed the outbreak of the international crisis, the correlation of forces was altered-both in the EU as a whole and in its leading group-in favour of Germany. The widening of the gap at the expense of France and Italy is expressed above all by the limited average annual rate of changes in the GDP per decade, while it is reflected in balance of current accounts and their fiscal situation. 

Over the last decade (2006-2016), the average annual GDP growth rate in the Eurozone fluctuated around 0.54%, i.e. was stagnant. Germany’s superiority is also reflected in its average annual growth rate, which stands at 1.2% in comparison to 0.6% for Italy and 0.7% for France.

A number of factors that played a role in the weak recovery of the Eurozone, such as the significant fall in fuel prices and the devaluation of the Euro are expected to dissipate. At the same time, a number of developments (e.g. Brexit, a tendency for the reinforcement of protectionism, major problems in big European banks) will influence the prospect and rates of capitalist growth in the EU and Eurozone.

The European Commission is attempting to support the recovery trajectory through a small relaxation of the fiscal policy, while the European Central Bank, on its part, is implementing measures for a relative relaxation of fiscal policy. At the same time, all the institutions of the EU, in accord with the governments of the member-states, are promoting restructuring in order to ensure cheap labour power for the business groups.

The policies of the European Union cannot however blunt the unevenness inside the Eurozone, which is reflected in the increasing gap between the countries that have stable trade surpluses (Germany and the Netherlands etc.) and the majority of the member-states that have trade deficits. In this context, the well-known proposal of the 5 presidents was tabled (of the Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament and the Eurogroup) with aim of functioning as a negotiating framework for «Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union». This proposal focuses on the issue of the Financial Union, the Fiscal Union and the deepening of the process with Political Union as the goal, based on the existing EU treaties.

18. The result of the British referendum and the rise of bourgeois euroscepticism in France, Italy and other EU member-states, create the potential for the reinforcement of centrifugal forces, new referenda and a new weakening of the EU.

The result of the Brexit reflects to an extent the more general negative stance of the British bourgeois class as regards the trajectory of deepening the EMU and EU, its stable convergence with the USA in its competition with Germany, the existence of sections of British and US capital that desired Britain's exit from the EU and the entrapment of the people's discontent in the current of bourgeois euroscepticism. At the same time, there is also some activity in the direction of seeking a rerun of the referendum.

From what it seems, however, the general direction of the negotiations will be to maintain a "close relationship" with the EU. On this terrain the dilemmas for the bourgeois political line in Germany and the rest of the EU member-states are becoming more complicated. To begin with, the dominant line of the German bourgeois class operates between maintenance of the intergovernmental character of the decisions of the EU and the imposition in practice of a multi-speed EU of many concentric circles with the application of strict rules in fiscal policy. However, German social-democracy converges to a great extent with the proposals of France and Italy for the deepening of European integration.

The governments of France and Italy-as well as the rest of the countries that belong to the so-called “Club Med" that was formed  through the signing of the "Athens Declaration"-are demanding the relaxation of the fiscal policy so that they can to a greater extent utilize fiscal tools to assist capitalist profitability  and the course of deepening the unification of the Eurozone ( a unified parliament and a unified budget for the Eurozone, unified governance etc.) so that Germany in practice takes on the role of the guarantor for the indebted states and the problematic big banks in the EU. At the same time, the eurosceptic current of the opposition is strengthening in France and Italy.

Some member-states that maintain close relations with the USA, such as the Visegrad group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) as well as Sweden and Denmark seek the maintenance of the intergovernmental character and the reinforcement of the independence of national politics concerning various issues (e.g. immigration-refugees).

The confrontation over the formula that will be politically implemented is objectively linked to the controversy regarding the international alliances of the EU. And here there are major differences, both amongst the member-states and inside them. There is also a confrontation concerning the relations of the EU and some of its member-states with the USA, Russia, and also with China.

The USA intervenes in the developments in the EU, supporting Italy and France concerning the issue of relaxing the fiscal policy as well as the Visegrad group and the Scandinavian countries.

Russia, in turn, intervenes concerning the antagonisms inside the EU, supporting political forces and states that take a position against the deepening of capitalist unification in the framework of the EU. This stance of Russia's was reinforced even further by the increase of the tension in EU-Russia relations, as a result of the aim to attach Ukraine to the EU, against the Russian plans to integrate it into the Eurasian Economic Community. Russia is also opposed to the EU's plans for the gradual integration of the states of the Western Balkans. The EU's accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro have already begun, despite that the situation remains changeable.

It is worth noting that these contradictions, as regards the political formula implemented by the EU, are unfolding in the context of the G20's decision in favour of relaxing fiscal benefit to support public investments.

The relations and the competition inside the EU will be influenced-and possibly will sharpen-in the next period by a number of political developments, such as the result of the recent referendum on the revision of the constitution in Italy and the impending elections in France and Germany.

19. The domestic bourgeoisie has a strategy and, based on this objective situation, adjusts and prioritizes basic goals that the negotiating line and more general economic policies of the SYRIZA-ANEL government must serve. Its main priorities are:

a) The restructuring of the state debt, more generally the terms of service of state financing from abroad, in order to stabilize and accelerate the Greek economy's exit from the phase of the capitalist crisis.

b) The realization of major investments that will contribute to promoting the country as a transport hub for energy and commodities from the wider region.

c) The capitalist productive reconstruction that will also change the current sectoral structure of the economy in order to strengthen the orientation towards exports and the production of innovative competitive commodities and services. In this framework, emphasis is placed on attracting investments in the industrial sectors of  hydrocarbon extraction, transport and logistics, renewable energy, specialized tourism, the agricultural/food-processing sector with an export orientation, and sectors of the economy are being prioritized that could function as new powerhouses for capitalist growth, together with the more measures to strengthen oceangoing shipping.

d) The promotion of “restructuring” measures to ensure cheap labour power (e.g. labour relations, social security) and new profitable areas of investment for capital (e.g. liberalization of markets, privatizations).

e) The modernization of the structure, functioning and infrastructure of the bourgeois state so that it can more effectively contribute to advancing the goals of the ruling class (e.g. the improvement of the tax collection capacity of the state through the creation of the digital property register).

The negotiating line of the domestic bourgeois class in order to promote these goals in a combined way:

• Supports the pressure exerted by Italy and France for the relative relaxation of fiscal policy in the Eurozone.
• Actively participates in promoting the plans of the USA and Israel in the wider region.
• Develops contradictory relations of competition and cooperation with Turkey.
• Attempts to enhance bilateral relations with China and to a lesser extent with Russia in order to implement the investment plans related to the transport of energy and commodities to the EU.

The dominant line of bourgeois politics in Greece considers the country remaining in the EU framework of imperialist alliances as a given, while at the same time there continue to be the especially close relations between Greek shipping capital and the USA and Britain, the reinforcement of the economic relations with China.